United Nations peace operations and International Relations theory: An introduction

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International Relations (IR) theories may seem abstract and arcane. With this book, we want to dispel this stereotype. The contributors to this volume demonstrate how IR theories can be applied to a very practical problem: UN peace operations, one of the main instruments of international conflict management. Besides peace operations, the chapters shed light on many other aspects of international affairs, such as multilateral co-operation, the role of international bureaucracies, and evolution and contestation of norms. At the same time, the reader whose interest in the volume has been sparked by its thematic focus will find state-of-the-art research on the main issues affecting UN peace operations, ranging from the impact of rising powers to a widening space for individual initiative.

UN peace operations have undergone multiple transformations over more than seventy years of their existence. They have developed from small-scale observation missions to multidimensional operations with military, police, and civilian personnel in charge of a wide range of tasks. UN peacekeepers have organised elections, helped deliver humanitarian assistance, protected civilians, advised on security sector reform, facilitated community reconciliation, and fought rebel groups. This evolution has been gradual, although the end of the Cold War was a powerful impetus for change. The
question of why UN peacekeeping operations take the shape that they do has become a major concern in the IR literature only recently, despite the fact that these operations are multi-billion-dollar undertakings fundamentally reshaping lives of people around the world.

In the past, UN peacekeeping scholarship and IR literature have been criticised for the lack of mutual engagement. Two decades ago, Paris (2000: 30) called UN peacekeeping scholarship ‘a secluded outpost within IR’ for its distance from the major political science debates and emphasis on policy relevance. Two years later, Jakobsen (2002: 267–8) criticised ‘the preoccupation with practical issues and case studies that has always characterised the study of peace operations’. Yet the IR scholarship could also be blamed for the lack of rapprochement: there was ‘limited attention paid to the role and purpose of peace operations from within the intellectual context of International Relations theory’ (Pugh 2003: 104). Even in the second half of the 2000s, Bures (2007: 407) observed that the literature on peacekeeping was ‘idiosyncratic and atheoretical’, while Lindley (2007: 3) characterised it as ‘a surprisingly theory-free zone’. As late as 2015, peacekeeping research was described as ‘largely a-theoretical’ and ‘focused on the practical concern’ (Diehl and Druckman 2015: 94).

In fact, the peacekeeping literature has frequently used IR theories, but the application has often been implicit rather than explicit. The situation has begun to change recently as a result of two trends: first, peacekeeping scholars have emphasised the connection between their work and the broader IR literature; second, the interest in peacekeeping as a subject for developing and testing IR theories has surged among political scientists. As a result, major IR concepts – power, sovereignty, collective action, delegation, and gender – have found new applications in the peacekeeping scholarship, while peacekeeping has become a source of conceptual development and empirical innovation in the IR literature. This is an overdue development, considering the political and material
Introduction

resources that member states, international organisations, and civil society actors have invested in peacekeeping.

This volume analyses UN peacekeeping as an international institution in the broad meaning of the term. International institutions have been defined as ‘persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations’ (Keohane 1989: 3). We look not only at formal rules that shape peacekeeping (such as the UN Charter or the Security Council voting procedures) but also at norms (such as gender equality or environmentalism), principles (such as host states’ consent and impartiality), and practices (such as consultations with non-state actors or penholdership).

There are two main uses of this volume. First, it allows the reader to understand UN peacekeeping through different theoretical lenses. Second, it is a practical example of how IR theories – such as realism, liberal institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, constructivism, practice theory, critical security studies, feminist institutionalism, and complexity theory – can be applied to a specific policy issue. Applying these theories helps us understand why UN peacekeeping, as an international institution, has evolved in the direction that it has and functions in the way that it does.

Most analyses of peacekeeping, as well as of other issues in IR, often draw on several theoretical traditions, rather than one theory. We are grateful to our contributors for agreeing to this experiment which entailed thinking about peacekeeping through a single theoretical lens – even though it might not be the tradition on which they primarily draw in most of their work. We hope that by bringing various theoretical perspectives together, this volume will encourage theoretical eclecticism and not reify boundaries between different schools of thought.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, we familiarise the reader with a (necessarily brief) history of UN peacekeeping. Second, we discuss the changing character of
peacekeeping and the emergence of new concerns, ideas, and tasks. Third, we survey the main actors involved in peacekeeping governance. Fourth, we provide an overview of the main themes in the peacekeeping literature. Fifth, we survey the main methodologies and sources of data in peacekeeping research. Sixth, we acknowledge the volume’s limitations by discussing a theory which is not covered in this edition: historical institutionalism. Finally, we provide an outline of the volume.

Peacekeeping: From interposition to stabilisation

Peacekeeping has not been provided for in the UN Charter. Instead, it has been ‘invented’, and its principles have been gradually codified – and subsequently redefined. The creators of peacekeeping, Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson and UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, would have struggled to recognise the practice today. The first UN peacekeeping force was deployed in response to the 1956 Suez Crisis. Whilst earlier precedents of multinational observer groups existed both in UN and non-UN contexts (MacQueen 2006), the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) was the first example of military peacekeeping. UNEF supervised the withdrawal of French, British, and Israeli forces from the Egyptian territory and, following its completion, observed the ceasefire and served as a buffer between Israeli and Egyptian forces. Two years into UNEF’s deployment, Hammarskjöld presented a study of mission’s experience to the General Assembly, in which he proposed ‘certain basic principles and rules which would provide an adaptable framework for later operations’ (as cited in MacQueen 2006: 75). The three main principles of peacekeeping were the consent of the parties, neutrality, and non-use of force except in self-defence.

Despite being the ‘holy trinity’ of peacekeeping, these principles have been broadened and reinterpreted over time, indeed providing ‘an adaptable framework’. Deployed just four years after UNEF, the 1960 mission in Congo, facing a civil war and state collapse,
Introduction

used controversial tactics to protect civilians from violence and to preserve Congo’s territorial integrity. These tactics were at the time unacceptable to the major powers, triggering a crisis of peacekeeping (Fröhlich and Williams 2018). In 1973, in the context of the second UN Emergency Force, the self-defence rule was relaxed to include the ‘defence of the mission’ (Findlay 2002: 19), which would subsequently provide the basis for the use of force to protect civilians.

The model of peacekeeping pioneered by UNEF remained dominant throughout the Cold War, with a few notable exceptions. Military observers and lightly armed soldiers monitored ceasefires and separation lines, thus promoting confidence between the parties and allowing negotiations to proceed. These operations are called traditional or ‘first-generation’ peacekeeping. The end of the Cold War gave rise to several trends. With the demise of bipolarity, the Security Council was no longer blocked by the East–West rivalries and could use peacekeeping more actively. As the notion of human security gained traction, ‘soft security’ concerns – human rights, child soldiers, and wartime sexual violence – became more prominent. The UN’s willingness to assist with post-independence or democratic transitions necessitated taking up such unfamiliar tasks as ‘running elections, creating new police forces, repatriating refugees, and overseeing the demobilization of armies and the reintegration of deeply divided societies’ (Barnett 2009: 567). These operations were referred to as ‘second-generation’ peacekeeping. Various other definitions were offered, such as ‘extended’ or ‘wider’ peacekeeping (Findlay 2002: 6). The concept that gained the most currency is ‘multidimensional’ peacekeeping, reflecting the fact that instead of a single central task – confidence-building – missions had multiple responsibilities.

The term ‘third-generation’ peacekeeping was used for ‘peace enforcement’ missions, or operations that employed or threatened force to impose a settlement (Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 11). The experiments with peace enforcement in Somalia and Bosnia were
followed by a debate about the utility of force (Tharoor 1995; Berdal 2000). Despite doubts and apprehensions, neutrality was recast as impartiality in the early 2000s: the influential Brahimi Report argued that impartiality meant adhering to the principles of the UN Charter, not passivity in the face of violence perpetrated by one of the parties. Transitional administrations in Kosovo and East Timor have been sometimes described as the ‘fourth generation’ of peacekeeping (Katayanagi 2014: 127). Others have reserved the term ‘fourth-generation’ for non-UN operations, like those by the EU, the African Union, or NATO (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 75).³

Recasting neutrality as impartiality in the 2000s opened the door to a possibility of using force against a faction that reneges on the peace process or grossly violates human rights. In response, the UN stressed the difference between strategic and tactical consent: the former is granted by a legitimate host government and remains indispensable, while consent of the so-called ‘spoilers’ attempting to disrupt the peace process is treated differently (Johnstone 2011).

This is especially true in contemporary stabilisation missions that support the extension of state authority, which sometimes entails assisting with the restoration of government’s control over territory where rebel groups, and even terrorist groups, continue to operate (Karlsrud 2017). Yet it created a new set of problems: for example, after inconclusive elections, it might be difficult to determine who speaks for the legitimate host government (Karlsrud 2016: chapter 3). As we see, neither the foundational principles of peacekeeping nor peacekeepers’ day-to-day activities are immune to change and contestation.

Another way of thinking about the post-Cold War evolution of peacekeeping is by looking at the expansion and contraction in the numbers of deployed peacekeepers. For example, during the first ‘surge’, between 1989 and 1994, 20 new operations were deployed, raising the number of peacekeepers from 11,000 to 75,000. These numbers fell dramatically after the failures in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. For a while, the very survival of peacekeeping was
Introduction

in question. Yet after a period of soul-searching, the Security Council started authorising even more ambitious missions in what became the second ‘surge’. Large operations were established in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1999. The numbers of peacekeepers kept rising throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, reaching a ‘plateau’ at the beginning of the second decade, and exhibiting a downward trend since 2016 (International Peace Institute 2018). This plateauing has allowed for the development of a more consistent and professional approach to the management of peacekeeping.

The changing character of peacekeeping

The changes have been not only quantitative but also qualitative. Unlike UNEF, which focused on a short list of clearly defined tasks, contemporary peacekeeping missions fulfil more than a dozen functions and can consist of over twenty thousand troops supported by a large civilian component. The first UN multidimensional operation supervised Namibia’s transition to independence in 1989–90 by assisting in the organisation of the first election. Electoral assistance became one of the central activities in the early post-Cold War operations, although this focus has attracted academic criticism (Paris 2004). The second large multidimensional mission, the 1992 mission in Cambodia, was the first operation with a dedicated human rights component (Månsson 2006). It also ran a voter education campaign using its own radio station (Oksamytna 2018). The missions in Namibia and Cambodia broke new ground in several other respects. In Namibia, efforts to have gender-balanced staff were undertaken, and UN civilian police monitored the local police (Howard 2008). In Cambodia, new responsibilities included refugee assistance and help with disarmament; the latter would become a typical element of peacekeeping mandates from the 1990s onward (MacQueen 2006: 147).
Disarmament expanded to encompass not only demobilisation but also reintegration of former combatants, sometimes accompanied by repatriation or resettlement of foreign combatants.Restructuring and training of militaries, police forces, and other law enforcement authorities became known as security sector reform (Benner et al. 2011). Some missions monitored arms embargoes, helped bring war criminals to justice, or assisted the host government with the management of natural resources. In addition, many missions empowered various segments of the local population, such as women, youth, or civil society. In the late 2010s, local-level reconciliation received attention, in contrast with the past neglect of this area (Autesserre 2010). Finally, and quite controversially, some missions assisted the host government in combating insurgencies and stabilising key areas (Karlsrud 2015).

The expansion of tasks generated fears about conflicting mandates, the mismatch between ambition and resources, and the lack of doctrine. As the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy grew in size, it elaborated policy, guidance, and training materials for various peacekeeping functions. Efforts are under way to develop tools for measuring performance and ensuring accountability in peacekeeping (Lottholz and von Billerbeck 2019; Lundgren et al. 2020b). Perhaps the most important debate focuses on the ‘primacy of politics’ in peacekeeping, as called for by experts inside and outside the UN (UN 2015; see also Berdal and Ucko 2015). It remains to be seen if it leads to significant changes in peacekeeping policy and practice. Ensuring that peacekeeping missions receive clear strategic direction is complicated by the sheer number of actors involved in the governance and management of UN peacekeeping.

UN peacekeeping governance

National diplomats and military experts, UN officials in New York and in missions, other organisations in the UN family, NGOs, and experts are engaged in the conversation on peacekeeping. The
Introduction

Security Council bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN Charter outlines several mechanisms that the Council can use to fulfil this role. They fall under Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes, or Chapter VII, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace and Acts of Aggression. Since peacekeeping was not explicitly envisaged in the Charter, the Cold War practice was characterised by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld as falling under ‘Chapter VI and a half’. Most missions in the twenty-first century, especially those with a mandate for protection of civilians, have been authorised under Chapter VII, the ‘enforcement’ chapter. The Council’s five permanent veto-holding members (China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US) are referred to as the P5. France, the UK, and the US, the three ‘Western’ members, are called the P3. The Council has ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms. Elections take place every year to replace five of the ten non-permanent members.

The General Assembly has several committees where peacekeeping is discussed: the Special Political and Decolonisation Committee (the Fourth Committee) for the substantive aspects and the Administrative and Budgetary Committee (the Fifth Committee) for the financial aspects. Of relevance is also the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations known as C-34 because it had initially consisted of 34 members contributing troops to peacekeeping operations. Today it has almost 150 members. Developing countries are the main contributors of troops and police to UN peacekeeping: in late 2018, the top ten contributors of uniformed personnel were Ethiopia, Rwanda, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, and Tanzania.

Developing countries seek to use the General Assembly committees to influence the evolution of peacekeeping (Cunliffe 2013: 225; Sharland 2018: 25). Since the Fifth Committee approves peacekeeping budgets, its willingness to finance civilian peacekeeping functions can affect the institutionalisation and implementation of
new agendas. Peacekeeping operations and peacekeeping-related posts in New York are financed mostly from the peacekeeping support account (and a small portion of the expenses are financed from the regular UN budget). The payments into the peacekeeping support account, unlike voluntary contributions to the budgets of UN agencies like the UN Development Programme, are obligatory (and thus called ‘assessed contributions’), and the P5 contribute at a higher rate to reflect their special responsibilities. The UN regular budget for 2018–19 was $5.4 billion, of which $106 million was spent on peacekeeping. The peacekeeping support account was $6.7 billion, bringing the overall peacekeeping spending to $6.8 billion, which was almost 29 per cent more than the allocation for all other Secretariat’s activities combined.

After the Security Council authorises peacekeeping operations and the General Assembly approves their budgets, the UN Secretariat assumes the responsibility for their management. The UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is a ‘fragile, extremely decentralized, and highly politicized organization’ (Benner et al. 2011: 35), which consists of officials at New York headquarters spread across several departments and staff deployed to more than a dozen field missions. Like officials of any other international organisation, UN staff transform broad directions of intergovernmental bodies ‘into workable doctrines, procedures, and ways of acting in the world’ (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 5). The Secretariat prepares budget proposals and guidance documents for peacekeeping missions, such as command directives, rules of engagement, concepts of operation, force requirements, and initial operational plans. The Secretariat also reports to the Security Council on both thematic and country-specific issues related to peacekeeping. Country-specific reports not only transmit information about the developments on the ground, which can influence Council’s decision-making, but also outline options for the way forward (Oksamytna and Lundgren 2021). The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was created in 1992 and the Department of Field Support (DFS) was
Introduction

created in 2007. In 2019, the DPKO was renamed the Department of Peace Operations and the DFS was renamed the Department of Operational Support. Political missions and peacebuilding offices, which lack a military component, are managed by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.

The UN Secretariat appoints the leadership of peacekeeping operations: the civilian head of the mission, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), and senior uniformed staff (the Force Commander and Police Commissioner), albeit not without member states’ interference (Oksamytzna et al. 2020). Mission leadership plays an important role in determining how the operation implements its mandate. Peacekeeping missions have a considerable degree of discretion in interpreting Security Council resolutions. SRSGs enjoy ‘significant delegated authority to set the direction of the mission and to lead its engagement with the political process on the ground’ (UN DPKO 2008: 68; see also Karlsrud 2013). Force Commanders devise military strategies. Troops and police officers voluntarily supplied by member states carry out military and police duties. While the Secretariat develops training materials, it is the responsibility of troop-contributing countries to ensure that their personnel receives appropriate pre-deployment training. Civilian specialists, who are recruited by the Secretariat internationally and locally, are in charge of a variety of political, peacebuilding, and support tasks.

External actors also take an active part in debates on UN peacekeeping. NGOs stepped up advocacy aimed at the Security Council or specific missions during the humanitarian crises of the early and mid-1990s (Labonte 2013; Oksamytzna 2017). Karlsrud (2016) has suggested the term ‘linked ecologies’ to describe informal policy alliances between diplomats, bureaucrats, activists, and researchers in international organisations and at the UN in particular. Such alliances have been referred to as the ‘third’ or ‘outside-insider’ UN, while the ‘first UN’ is an arena for intergovernmental negotiations and the ‘second UN’ is the bureaucracy (Weiss et al. 2009).
For example, actors from across the ‘three UNs’ have promoted the agendas on women and on children in conflict and post-conflict situations. In the former case, the coalition included the UN’s Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues; the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security; and elected Council members Namibia, Bangladesh, and Canada (Tryggestad 2008). In the latter case, the coalition included the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict; Human Rights Watch and other NGOs; France; and many elected members (Bode 2018).

Peacekeeping governance is characterised by ‘shifting attention and participation’ (Lipson 2010: 253), linked to the rotation of non-permanent Security Council members; changing priorities of, and relations among, the P5; Secretariat reforms; turnover of mission personnel; and ebbs and flows in NGO funding cycles. This complexity makes UN peacekeeping a fertile ground for developing and testing theories of international co-operation, institutional evolution, and normative change.

Main themes in the peacekeeping literature

Before the recent advances in peacekeeping theorising, the field had been dominated by historical accounts of peacekeeping’s evolution, including memoirs of former UN officials and diplomats; in-depth case studies of specific missions; and investigations of individual countries’ peacekeeping policies. Many of these studies are excellent resources for deepening the understanding of peacekeeping. However, as the literature on UN peacekeeping grew more diverse and sophisticated, three main theory-driven strands of scholarship emerged: first, the supply and demand, or reasons why states contribute personnel to peacekeeping operations or send missions to certain conflicts; second, the effects of peacekeeping, or positive and negative consequences of peacekeeping operations; and third, the relations between the ‘global’ and the ‘local’ in peacekeeping. While a detailed survey is impossible here, and
Introduction

overviews exist already (Fortna and Howard 2008; Gizelis et al. 2016), we discuss illustrative examples from each of the strands of scholarship, as well as how these strands draw on IR theories.

In terms of the supply and demand, scholars have established that peacekeepers are sent to more difficult and severe conflicts (Fortna 2008; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012), which are characterised by a higher number of civilian casualties (Gilligan and Stedman 2003). Within the country, peacekeepers are sent to more violent areas (Ruggeri et al. 2018). Nevertheless, both globally (Lundgren et al. 2020a; Coleman et al. 2020) and locally (Fjelde et al. 2019), peacekeepers often deploy to crisis areas with a delay, and many missions fail to reach the authorised strength (Passmore et al. 2018). Still, considering that troops, police, and most equipment are provided voluntarily by the member states, the UN’s ability to deploy more than one hundred thousand uniformed personnel is impressive. Member states have different motivations for contributing personnel to peacekeeping missions, which may include financial benefits (governments are currently reimbursed at a rate of $1,428 per soldier per month, which might exceed deployment costs in some, but definitely not all, countries, as Coleman and Nyblade (2018) argue), experience, prestige, voice, and a desire to contribute to international conflict resolution for altruistic or strategic reasons. 6

In terms of the consequences of peacekeeping, scholars have wondered whether peacekeeping ‘works’: whether it is a successful tool for resolving or, at a minimum, containing conflict (for an overview, see Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017). Most studies tend to reach the cautious conclusion that, under the right circumstances, at least some missions succeed. Doyle and Sambanis (2006: 335) argue that ‘UN missions that are properly matched to the ecology of the conflict (and especially multidimensional PKOs [peacekeeping operations]) help foster positive peace and prevent the recurrence of war’. Fortna (2008) demonstrates that the chances of hostilities resuming are reduced by up to a staggering 85 per cent if peacekeepers are present. Missions with a large number of uniformed
personnel are associated with reduced battlefield deaths (Hultman et al. 2014). Peacekeepers even have an impact on local conflict resolution (Ruggeri et al. 2017; Smidt 2020). Howard (2008) shows that operations that are flexible and adaptive can be effective.

Besides assessing peacekeeping operations’ contribution to the mitigation or resolution of conflict, their ability to fulfil key mandated tasks has also been analysed. The presence of a UN mission with a large uniformed component correlates with a decrease in civilian killings (Hultman et al. 2013). Peacekeeping missions which are diverse in terms of national composition are more effective in fulfilling this task (Bove and Ruggeri 2016). Peacekeepers’ presence goes hand in hand with a decrease in sexual violence (Hultman and Johansson 2017). UN peacekeeping missions with a humanitarian focus have been linked with better human rights performance in post-conflict countries (Murdie 2017).

Yet, sometimes, peacekeepers cause intentional or unintentional harm. Sexual exploitation and abuse of the local population have been linked with the spread of HIV/AIDS (Kent 2007). Environmental mismanagement has led to the introduction of cholera in Haiti (Lemay-Hébert 2014). While sexual exploitation and abuse are an intentional action by troops disobeying the UN’s conduct and discipline regulations, the cholera outbreak in Haiti is an example of an unintended consequence of peacekeeping. Whilst the effects of peacekeeping missions on the local economy can be positive overall, unintended negative consequences include higher rents and unfair competition by well-resourced missions for local talent (Ammitzboell 2007). In terms of the effects on domestic politics in troop-contributing countries, there is a debate whether peacekeeping participation improves or weakens regime stability, democracy, or civil–military relations (Sotomayor 2014; Cunliffe 2018; Lundgren 2018).

In terms of local–global relations, statebuilding and peacebuilding activities of contemporary UN operations are ‘extensive intrusions into the domestic affairs of other legally sovereign states’ (Doyle and
Introduction

Sambanis 2006: 22). Peacekeepers’ tendency to promote Western values, like democracy and market liberalism, has been criticised for being inappropriate in some circumstances (Paris 2004; Richmond and Franks 2009). Peacebuilders have been accused of acting in a paternalistic fashion (Autesserre 2016). The most radical stream within this scholarship is the so-called ‘hyper-critical’ (the term is from Paris 2010: 338) school that believes that contemporary peacekeeping and peacebuilding are fundamentally destructive and illegitimate. For example, Western states have been suspected of shifting the costs of maintaining the world order (and their privileged position in this order) on to troops from developing countries that now provide the bulk of UN peacekeeping forces (Cunliffe 2013). However, the UN and other international institutions have increasingly turned to the language of ‘local ownership’, yet scholars have questioned whether it can be reconciled with the overarching logic and priorities of foreign peacekeepers and peacebuilders (Caplan 2004; Lemay-Hébert 2012; Schia and Karlsrud 2013; von Billerbeck 2017).

Theory-informed peacekeeping research has been published in dedicated journals (such as International Peacekeeping), peace and security journals (such as Journal of Peace Research), and general IR journals (such as International Organization). The number of articles on peacekeeping in general IR journals has increased in recent years, pointing to an interest in the issue among political scientists and a willingness on the part of peacekeeping researchers to connect with the broader IR scholarship more explicitly.

Methods and data in the study of peacekeeping

Each of the three themes outlined above has featured a different mix of research methodologies. The literature on the supply and demand has often used quantitative analyses to investigate whether UN peacekeeping operations are sent to more difficult conflicts or whether their deployment is affected by trade ties (Stojek and
Tir 2015) or military alliances (Mullenbach 2005). Using a method which bridges quantitative and qualitative methods, Binder (2017) employed qualitative comparative analysis to investigate reasons behind international interventions in conflicts, peacekeeping operations being a subset of all interventions. Qualitative studies that analyse decision-making surrounding deployment of peacekeeping operations have looked at the policies of specific member states (an overview of P5’s positions can be found in de Coning et al. 2017), although these studies are situated at the intersection of foreign policy analysis and IR and not always explicitly theoretical.

The study of reasons why countries provide peacekeepers has also used quantitative analyses or single, sometimes comparative, case studies. The quantitative literature has investigated whether democracies are more likely to contribute to peacekeeping operations (Lebovic 2004) and how mission composition influences the decision to contribute (Ward and Dorussen 2016). The qualitative literature has focused on the policies of specific troop-contributing countries; a useful overview of their positions can be found on the website of the Providing for Peacekeeping project (International Peace Institute et al. 2019).

The analysis of peacekeeping effectiveness has been dominated by quantitative studies of UN missions’ effects on conflict or civilian victimisation, as described above, or specific outcomes, like democratisation (Steinert and Grimm 2015) or reduction in sexual violence (Johansson and Hultman 2019). On the other hand, studies of how, as opposed to whether, peacekeeping works have been mostly qualitative and used such concepts as local legitimacy (Whalan 2013) and transparency (Lindley 2007). Scholarship on the unintended consequences of peacekeeping tends to be descriptive, although systematic quantitative (Hultman 2010) and qualitative studies have started to appear (von Billerbeck and Tansey 2019 is the foundation of a comparative project on inadvertent enabling of authoritarianism).

An interesting development is the use of survey methodology to assess the effects of exposure to peacekeeping on state–society
Introduction

relations (Blair 2019). Surveys, focus groups, and participant observation have been employed to understand the role of peacekeepers’ gender and their ability to contribute to mission’s success (Karim and Beardsley 2017). Surveys have also been used in the literature on local–global relations to investigate the attitudes of the targets of peacekeeping – the so-called peacekept – towards the mission (Gordon and Young 2017). Among the three stands of scholarship, however, the analysis of local–global relations has gravitated the most towards qualitative methodologies.

The sources of data for peacekeeping scholarship have predominantly been archives, interviews, and various datasets (on the latter, see Clayton 2017 for an overview). Datasets are available on the number of troops and police contributed to peacekeeping operations by different member states (Kathman 2013); the gender of peacekeeping troops, police, and civilian staff (Smit and Tidblad-Lundholm 2018); nationalities and tenures of peacekeeping leaders (Bove et al. 2016); attacks on peacekeeping missions and peacekeepers’ fatalities (Henke 2019); and tasks assigned to new and revised mandates (Di Salvatore et al. 2020). New sources of data might be made available by missions themselves, like data from Joint Mission Analysis Centres, which is so far available only for the joint African Union–UN mission in Darfur (Duursma 2019). This overview shows that the literature on peacekeeping is diverse not only thematically but also methodologically and characterised by increasing innovativeness and sophistication.

Limitations

Before proceeding to an overview of the volume’s chapters, we acknowledge that there is a major IR theory that we do not cover: historical institutionalism. The applications of this theory in the peacekeeping literature have been few and far between, as compared with the scholarship on international organisations more broadly, although the notion of unintended consequences can be attributed
to this brand of new institutionalism. In terms of peacekeeping’s evolution, Daase (1999) conceptualises peacekeeping as a spontaneous institution, where precedent, institutional reform, or deviating practice (what historical institutionalists would call incremental adjustments) drive change. Mullenbach (2005) applies the historical institutionalist notion of sunk costs to the analysis of peacekeeping deployments, arguing that previous involvement in a crisis by a regional or international organisation increases the probability of a UN peacekeeping mission. Similarly, Binder (2017) argues that sunk costs – together with the interests of Security Council members, the moral pressure to assist people in need, and the host state’s ability to resist international involvement – collectively explain the decision to authorise interventions, including peacekeeping operations. Howard and Dayal (2018) build on the notion of precedent and complemented it with a psychological explanation to account for the persistence of Chapter VII peacekeeping mandates. While few peacekeeping researchers would self-identify as historical institutionalists, many ideas and concepts from this theoretical tradition are present in the peacekeeping literature.

Outline of the book

All chapters in this volume seek to answer the same question using a specific theory of IR: Why does UN peacekeeping take the shape that it does? Following a brief overview of the main theoretical assumptions of a certain school of thought about the nature of international relations, the main actors, their motivations, and sources of change, chapters review how the theory has been applied in the field of peacekeeping. If the application has been limited, the authors offer their thoughts as to why this has been the case. The authors also offer a case study based on their own research to demonstrate the usefulness of the theory for peacekeeping research. The chapters usually round off with a discussion of the theory’s potential for explaining or understanding UN peacekeeping.
Introduction

Starting with the classical IR theory, realism, Philip Cunliffe (Chapter 1) examines the effects of the distribution of power in the international system on peacekeeping. As peacekeeping is a major tool of peace and security in international relations, Cunliffe argues that realism offers a theoretical lens to examine and compare peacekeeping with other types of state behaviour in the peace and security domain. States compete for power through and over peacekeeping, he argues. By examining this, we can better understand great power competition for power, status, and prestige through international organisations. He concludes that peacekeeping, as we know it today, is a product of a unique post-Cold War unipolar moment – and thus should not be taken for granted as the international system continues to evolve.

In their chapter on liberal institutionalism, Carla Monteleone and Kseniya Oksamytina (Chapter 2) examine how insights from liberal institutionalism have been applied to UN peacekeeping, in particular to Security Council negotiations on peacekeeping deployments, domestic sources of member states’ peacekeeping policy, and troop contributions. Focusing on Security Council negotiations, the chapter argues that the Council voting record provides only a part of the picture. To provide a more comprehensive picture, the chapter uses data on the sponsorship of peacekeeping resolutions to detect the existence of a dominant coalition which drives peacekeeping decision-making. This coalition has consisted of the US and European states in the recent period but can be challenged or replaced by a different coalition, depending on member states’ preferences and strategies in the Council.

Similarly, rational choice institutionalism stresses the national interest of member states of international organisations but analyses the role of their secretariats as well. Member states might choose to delegate the execution of certain tasks to secretariats if it helps them advance their interest, creating a degree of autonomy for international bureaucracies. Since bureaucracies are assumed to be interested in expansion, states need to maintain overall control.
Kseniya Oksamytna and John Karlsrud

At the same time, as Yf Reykers argues in Chapter 3, it is not only the UN Security Council that delegates to the UN Secretariat in peacekeeping: the Secretariat, in turn, delegates to peacekeeping missions on the ground, which complicates oversight. In addition, the UN Security Council can authorise regional and sub-regional organisations to undertake peacekeeping missions, which poses unique problems in terms of delegation. Applying rational choice institutionalism can help scholars better understand the complex politics of mandating and control of UN peacekeeping and the relationships between the principals and many levels of agents of UN peacekeeping – member states, New York headquarters, and operations in the field.

Unlike rational choice institutionalism, which focuses on the interests of international organisations’ member states and officials, sociological institutionalism argues that norms, rules, and cultures shape behaviour as well as constitute identities and self-images of actors. Through an examination of the preferences, interests, and behaviours of UN peacekeepers, sociological institutionalism can explain actions that may appear as inefficient or outright contradictory. Through a case study of local perceptions of local ownership among peacekeeping staff, von Billerbeck shows in Chapter 4 how staff are socialised to explain, legitimise, and accept actions, even when these actions do not align with the declared ideals of the organisation, and may lead to suboptimal outcomes.

Constructivism also attaches great importance to the role of international organisations’ officials in shaping and interpreting the normative framework in which they operate. As Marion Laurence and Emily Paddon Rhoads observe in Chapter 5, the core norms guiding peacekeeping – consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defence – have been contested and reinterpreted throughout the institution’s history, allowing new approaches and areas of action to emerge. The most recent generation of constructivist research, including by the authors in the current volume, pays attention not only to the emergence and contestation of norms...
Introduction

but also their practical implementation. In their case study of the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), Laurence and Paddon Rhoads shows how constructivism can help explain the interpretation and (non-)implementation of norms in practice; how peacekeepers can have an impact on local norms, identities, and cultures; and how a rebalance between the norms of impartiality and stability in MONUSCO may reflect shifting norms at the global level.

Critical constructivism has some parallels with the reflexive strand of practice theory, which argues that agents perform socially meaningful practices guided by their background knowledge but remain capable of making choices based on their contextualised understanding of the situation. Ingvild Bode (Chapter 6) shows how practice theories, although often requiring significant efforts in gathering primary data, can help us access and understand change as well as continuity in peacekeeping. In her case study, she examines how the concept of competent practice helps understand continuous divergences over the protection-of-civilians norm in UN peacekeeping. Based on in-depth interviews with UN military advisers for a study conducted with John Karlsrud, the chapter demonstrates that different ways of conceptualising and performing protection of civilians are likely to persist regardless of the progressive strengthening of the norm.

Critical theory asks us to be reflective of the fact that no theories are neutral: all theories help us frame our understanding and select what we want to study and what is seen as less important. Lucile Maertens in Chapter 7 looks at the discursive construction and framing of new agendas in UN peacekeeping. The idea that security and insecurity are discursively constructed belongs to the critical security studies school. After reviewing the contribution of critical security studies to problematising the liberal orientation of the contemporary peacebuilding enterprise, Maertens investigates how the environment has been promoted to become an appropriate concern for UN peacekeepers, and how peacekeeping has been
promoted to become relevant for environmental policies. Maertens then shows how this reciprocal engagement has contributed to two broader processes of environmentalisation of peacekeeping, and, more worryingly, the securitisation of the environment.

Like critical security studies, feminist institutionalism pays attention to gendered, racialised, and classed power relations. Georgina Holmes (Chapter 8) brings examples of structural inequalities in UN peacekeeping missions, such as the UN mission in Mali where peacekeepers from the developed and developing world perform different tasks, some of them more dangerous than others. Gender also creates inequalities. Seeking to achieve women’s meaningful participation and end other forms of discrimination, feminist institutionalism seeks to uncover and disrupt existing formal and informal power structures, management practices, and institutional barriers that are gendered and produce gendered effects. Holmes analyses gender mainstreaming during the training and deployment of Ghanaian peacekeepers, especially how superficial changes made in response to the UN’s demand for female peacekeepers were layered on top of well-entrenched ideas about male and female social roles.

The chapters discussed above point to the multiplicity of actors, interactions, and locations involved in the evolution of UN peacekeeping: the UN Security Council, UN officials at New York headquarters and in the field, troop-contributing countries, and regional organisations co-operating with the UN. Charles T. Hunt (Chapter 9) shows how UN peace operations can be studied as a complex social system with idiosyncratic behaviours in highly dynamic and nonlinear environments applying complexity theory. Hunt shows that, drawing on the insights of complexity theory, we are better able to understand the production of UN peacekeeping through global politics as well as their operations in practice. In conclusion, he also points to how UN peace operations can become part of the conflict systems they seek to manage and transform on systemic as well as individual levels.
Introduction

In the concluding chapter, Mats Berdal offers reflections about the state of the theory-driven UN peacekeeping literature and the IR discipline more broadly. He challenges the perception that the literature on UN peace operation has been largely atheoretical until recently. During the Cold War and in the 1990s, scholars studied peacekeeping and its connections to global politics on the basis of different theoretical perspectives, such as the English School. Professor Berdal also reminds us that when we talk about the ‘UN’, we should keep in mind that it is ultimately an intergovernmental organisation shaped by member states who design peace operations and also implement them by providing troops, which carry out the mandate in the field but often seek guidance from national capitals. UN peace operations involve a multiplicity of actors, levels, and locations. We hope that this volume will help our readers understand the complex world of UN peace operations through well-established and cutting-edge theoretical perspectives.

Notes

1 Contemporary peace operations are more multidimensional than traditional peacekeeping and often include elements of peacebuilding (and occasionally enforcement). In this book, the terms ‘peace operations’ and ‘peacekeeping’ are used interchangeably to refer to operations authorised by the UN Security Council and led by the UN Department of Peace Operations.

2 A distinction is made between groups of military observers deployed to oversee ceasefires in the Middle East in 1948 and Kashmir in 1949, on the one hand, and peacekeeping forces involving infantry battalions, such as UN Emergency Force, on the other hand (Diehl 2015).

3 Thakur and Schnabel (2001: 9–14) offer a different classification, arguing that the first generation was traditional peacekeeping; the second generation was non-UN peacekeeping (including both multinational observer groups and intervention forces); the third generation was multidimensional peacekeeping; the fourth generation was peace enforcement; the fifth generation was partnership peacekeeping (including partnerships with member states and regional organisations); and the sixth generation was transitional administrations.

4 Some peacekeeping posts in the Secretariat are long-term and funded from the regular budget; others fluctuate according to the number of deployed
Kseniya Oksamytna and John Karlsrud

peacekeepers and are funded from the Peacekeeping Support Account (Dijkstra 2016: chapter 3).

For example, the Secretariat might have under-reported important information on the Rwandan genocide to the Council (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: chapter 5).

For illustrative examples of qualitative and quantitative studies see, respectively, Bellamy and Williams (2013) and Sandler (2017). This literature is reviewed by Monteleone and Oksamytna (Chapter 2, this volume).

More scholarship that falls under the broad label of ‘critical security studies’ is reviewed by Maertens (Chapter 7, this volume).

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Introduction


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Introduction

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Introduction


Kseniya Oksamytna and John Karlsrud


30